Tuesday, July 29, 2014

William Lane Craig talking bizarro

Yesterday morning, I woke up to find that someone had sent me William Lane Craig's most recent Q&A piece on his website, Reasonable Faith. It's question #380, Bizarro Ontological Arguments, and I encourage you to read it here on your own because I don't want to reproduce almost any of it here but do want you to know why I'm saying what I'm saying.

In very short, a question comes in from an "agnostic undergraduate philosophy student," a topic that in general could merit a couple of chapters in a book about the sinister relationship between philosophy and theology, and asks about "ontological" arguments for God's existence, which Richard Dawkins correctly identified in The God Delusion as being word games that don't consider a single datum from reality. Ontological arguments for God basically provide a definition of God and then an argument that the thing being called God must exist for some "metaphysically necessary" reason. This question is specifically about the modal ontological argument, which is probably a waste of time in every regard unless someone is studying modal logic and wants to understand why it doesn't matter when it comes to something like the existence of God (though this second part is often ignored).

Craig answers in his typical fashion, all pomp and no circumstance, starting off this way, which is most of what I'll need to share to make my brief comments at the end.
It’s admittedly very difficult for the theist to provide any proof of the key premiss [sic] in the ontological argument, to wit
1. It is possible that a maximally great being (aka God) exists.
For that reason, Plantinga thought initially, at least, that the argument, though sound, is not “a successful piece of natural theology.” Nevertheless, Plantinga rightly insisted that the argument does show that belief in God’s existence is perfectly rational. For the person who accepts (1) is being entirely reasonable in his modal judgments. I think that counts as success in justifying a “reasonable faith.” For that reason I usually simply leave it to my audience to answer the question, “Do you think that it’s possible that God exists?” The concept of maximal greatness or of a maximally great being (a being that is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent in every possible world) seems perfectly coherent and therefore possible.
A few quick comments before moving on.
  1. One of the themes of Dot, Dot, Dot, my second book, was arguing that I don't think it is at all clear what "maximally great being" means or that such a thing is possible. In short, neither within the finite or the infinite do we find any mathematical reason to suggest that there is a point that is "maximally great." There is a way that seems to be able to be reconciled, but it's just weird and, like everything else Godly, ad hoc and smarmy.
  2. It looks like Craig relies upon an appeal to ignorance in arguing for God, something of the possible, therefore..., line, and that he isn't ashamed to admit it.
  3. I want to draw your attention to (as I will comment later), "I think that counts as success in justifying a 'reasonable faith.'"
I really can't bring myself to quote any more of Craig's claptrap here (including the part where he brings up Bizarro Superman, hence my title), so if you want to see what I'm talking about, please look for yourself. He goes on an on about metaphysical possibility and metaphysical necessity--the working objects of modal philosophy, after all--throughout the piece, bringing it up something like ten times in only a few hundred words. Granted, it's central to the topic at hand, but the point I want to make more broadly is that it isn't central to anything else. In fact, other than as a philosophical exercise, it's probably apropos of nothing.

I draw two things from this commentary on Craig's Q&A. Those, the clearest lessons I can think to draw from this, are
1. "Reason" is not enough
We must have good reasons to believe our ideas hook to reality, which doesn't fly for ideas just because we can think them and find them coherent, or even that they're metaphysically possible or necessary. Craig's qualifier for "reasonable faith" seems to be that faith can be come to by reason (so long as someone starts in the right place, which is, really, at faith). Reason, though, in this context is just what leads us from a set of premises to a set of conclusions, along with some speculating about the premises themselves. This isn't enough. To really get at reality, which is not necessarily the goal of thinking but is the goal of thinking about reality, one's premises must be far more solid than anything theology has to provide (Inner Witness of the Holy Spirit?! Sensus divinitatis?! Come on! Give me a break!).

2. We really shouldn't trust anyone who appeals to metaphysical importance. 
Those people are talking about ideas, and the importance means "important to this set of ideas following from certain presuppositions," or, in the case of Christians, "important to the way I make sense of the world, and necessary for these ideas to be coherent." They don't necessarily have anything to do with reality at all, and we shouldn't trust people who are confused on this point.

Honestly, I hope this young philosophy undergraduate, who identifies as "agnostic" and yet felt it appropriate to contact William Lane Craig, perhaps the world's most notorious Christian apologist, for philosophical answers, is not bamboozled by ideas alone and dodges the trap he seems to be trying to avoid.

No comments:

Post a Comment