The primary reason I think we should see the philosophy of religion this way is summarized best by something that Keith Parsons, a philosopher deeply involved with it, said a few years ago, quoted here by Dan Fincke from January 2011. Parsons wrote,
One of the things the really active conservative Christians covet enormously, more than anything else, is intellectual respectability. And they think they have found it in some of the arguments from these philosophers of religion.This, indeed, is a problem, and I think secular philosophers of religion, probably unwittingly, encourage it. That the philosophy of religion as a recognizable subdiscipline of philosophy only dates to post-WWII, as John Loftus has pointed out, quoting philosopher (of religion) Graham Oppy from his recent interview that really got this ball rolling, drives home this point further. Theology's alleged philosophical renaissance, which William Lane Craig is proud to note whenever he gets the chance, seems to have been part and parcel of the ascendance of the separate identification philosophy of religion. (We should note that all theology has is "philosophy," or pseudo-philosophy, as Richard Carrier puts it.)
At any rate, John's estimable and ambitious series is underway, having changed from a five-part series to a six-part, to keep it more digestible. Those parts can be found here:
- Part one, "On Ending the Philosophy of Religion Discipline"
- Part two, "Some Preliminaries to my Proposal for Ending the Philosophy of Religion"
- Part three, "What Exactly is my Proposal for Ending the Philosophy of Religion in Secular Universities?"
The purpose of my present post is to mention something I made in a comment on Part Two of John's series and elaborate upon it a bit. In brief, I think that apologists for the philosophy of religion utilize a value, which is to say a moral case, to defend the field's sense of legitimacy, and I think this is likely to be a bad way to justify this direction of study. Thus, I want to present and question that value. I wrote,
I think they [apologists for the philosophy of religion] work very hard to create a moral position out of one idea in particular: We should always engage the best arguments for a philosophical position. They turn this concept, as I said, into a matter of moral reckoning, which is to say into a (false?) virtue, which is to say something to be valued "for its own sake" (scare quotes because I don't accept the validity of that line of moral reasoning, but others do). With a value like this, they are influential in effecting the goal [of providing a sense of legitimacy to the philosophy of religion], which is making people care about PoR when ... they shouldn't. (emphasis added)I want to question that highlighed assumption. Should we always engage the best arguments for a philosophical position, at the risk of being bad or unfair to the field in question if we do not?
This, by the way, seems to be the main appeal made by secular philosopher of religion Paul Draper and his amateur acolytes, who have significant online presence and tend to beat people over the head with this assumption, insisting that anyone who fails to apply this maxim is a bad or disingenuous academic, even a partisan or an apologist (quelle ironic).
I, of course, think we should do this, as seems obvious, but only when it is appropriate. Thus, it isn't the academic value itself but the scope of its application that I am really questioning.
The relevant distinction is one that is outlined by the Courtier's Reply, which I feel apologists for the philosophy of religion are giving, despite their denial. They insist that the only way to understand whether questions about theism--a central concern of the philosophy of religion--are valid is to consider them on their own terms and giving them at least equal attention as arguments for naturalism (my thoughts about that here). The principle in question doesn't immediately seem to qualify as a Courtier's Reply, but I think it applies. Specifically, as the Rational Wiki puts it,
Denunciation of this particular fallacy [the Courtier's Reply], however, is quite easy to misuse. Whenever one is told to read more about a subject that he disagrees on, it is easy to accuse one's contradictors of giving a "Courtier's Reply". The element of the Courtier's Reply that is being forgotten here is that it asks the questioner to "read more" about a subject that begs the question. (emphasis original)Thus, I need to convince anyone who will believe me that the maxim as applied to theism, that we should treat it seriously, begs the question. I don't think this is actually controversial anymore, though. Since, as Loftus puts it--and I agree--what underlies theism is bogus, even taking theism seriously in philosophical terms is begging the question (while insisting it isn't). Loftus writes,
[T]here are some uncontested facts about faith that secular philosophers should teach their students, such as, faith isn't a legitimate answer to these questions and that all arguments on behalf of religion are nothing more than special pleading. Basing something on faith or logical fallacies is simply not teaching students correctly. (bold added to a claim Loftus has defended numerous times on his blogs and in his books)And he goes on,
The primary reason is that faith has no basis, and secondarily because there is no reason to invite faith into a state run secular university. We are proposing to teach the truth to students.And he quotes Peter Boghossian with his own annotation,
Educators have given faith-based claims preferential treatment. In the classrooms "It is taken for granted that faith-based claims are invulnerable to criticism and immune from further questioning" in the so-called "soft sciences" like sociology, philosophy, anthropology, etc. "This intellectual rigor mortis is not allowed to occur across all disciplines." In the hard sciences like mathematics, chemistry and biology "challenging claims and questioning reasoning processes are 'intrinsic to what it means to teach students to reason effectively'." So Boghossian says, "This needs to end" (p. 188). Educators in all disciplines of learning should grant faith based conclusions "no countenance. Do not take faith claims seriously. Let the utterer know that faith is not an acceptable basis from which to draw a conclusion that can be relied upon" (p. 189).Really putting it plain, Loftus wrote in the first part of his series,
To teach it correctly the professor should tell the truth about the lack of epistemic status of faith. Faith has no intellectual merit. It is not a virtue. It has no method. It solves no problems. It is not worthy of thinking people.On that basis, and others like it, it is very difficult to see the matter of theism as something to treat seriously as a philosophical object. We shouldn't. It is a theological object, and theology is only "pseudo-philosophical," as Carrier puts it, and pseudo-academic, as I outlined above. No one is required to take such a thing seriously or engage its "best" arguments, as if it has any, as if the real contenders haven't already been dealt with thoroughly and repeatedly, and as if any argument stands up to the simple and straightforward question that's been waiting for them all along: "Where's the evidence?"
But because the idea that we should engage any position's best case is generally true in philosophy proper, and all academic debate, it is an easy value to turn into a false virtue. The principle simply doesn't apply here because theology is pseudo-academic, though. Misapplying it as a false virtue, a moral value defining a particular kind of thinker, I think, is exactly what apologists for the philosophy of religion are doing, and I think it constitutes a confusing and unproductive avenue in the conversation that should not continue.